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Abstract
We analyze von Weizsa¨cker’s view regarding the concept of infor-
mation in physics. In his view, information arises from the reduction
of properties of a physical object to their logical descriptive proposi-
tions. The smallest element of a lattice of propositions is an atom of
information which is considered as the essence of every physical iden-
tity including position space. von Weizsa¨cker calls this element, “ur”.
Moreover, Biological evolution is described in terms of enhancement
of the variety of forms. Form could be also reduced to descriptive
logical propositions, thus to atoms of information. Therefore, infor-
mation is the fundamental basis in von Weizsa¨cker’s plan for unifying
all branches of Physics including Chemistry and Biology. Yet, there
are inadequacies in his lines of reasoning, critically assessed in this
paper.
1 Introduction
Carl Friedrich von Weizsa¨cker was a German philosopher and physicist whose
main research activities were on nuclear fusion in the sun and other stars and
on the creation of solar system. Yet, an impressive part of his works which
is the subject of the present paper, includes his efforts for getting a unified
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description of all laws of physics under a theory called ur-theory. He intro-
duced ur-theory in “Die Einheit der Natur” in 1971[1]. An improved version
of the book entitled “the structure of physics” has been published in 1985
which was translated to English in 2006 [2]. This book is the fruit of years of
efforts for obtaining a theory of unity of physics. In this book, information is
the most fundamental concept underlying physics. The centrality of informa-
tion in physics, however, was originally introduced by works on Boltzmann’s
formulation of entropy in thermodynamics that was very similar to Shan-
non’s measure of information and Maxwell’s demon which resulted to great
works on the role of information in physics. In the quantum area the concept
of information was introduced by von Neumann, before the recent work of
von Weizsa¨cker. Weizsa¨cker’s innovation is in using information as a central
concept for unifying all branches of physics including Biology and chemistry
which are also considered to be reducible to physics and in defining “ur”s
as atoms of information. Thus, information is believed to be also a basic
concept in the mentioned domains of natural science. The first part of the
book is devoted to the plan of reconstruction of quantum theory which is the
essence of ur-theory. In the second part of the book, the role of information
in unifying Biological evolution with the Second Law of Thermodynamics is
explained. In the last part of the book, von Weizsa¨cker talks about interpre-
tations of quantum theory.
In this paper we present a survey on his views focusing on the concept
of information. Since his philosophy has played a significant role on his view
about natural sciences and his plan for reconstruction of physics, we begin
with a short introduction about von Weizsa¨cker’s philosophical attitude, be-
fore entering and scrutinizing the main subject of his ideas, i.e., ur-theory.
Concepts like experience, time and phenomenon have significant roles in his
terminology. Therefore, we have devoted the second part of our paper to
these concepts. In the third section, we explain his views about reconstruc-
tion of quantum theory which is associated with the development of ur-theory
and its implications. In this regard, the role and significance of the concept
of information become clear. In section 4, we investigate the same concept
in Thermodynamics and Biology, in addition to von Weizsa¨cker’s view on
the consistency of Biological evolution with the Second Law of Thermody-
namics. Here, we assess the strength and coherence of his insight. In section
5, we present a critical analysis of ur-theory and show that the reduction
of physical concepts to informational properties in the way von Weizsa¨cker
describes has fundamental problems. The conclusion part is presented in the
last section.
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2 Experience, phenomenon and time
von Weizsa¨cker starts the first chapter of his book, “the structure of physics”
by the basic statement “physics is based on experience”. This statement has
a central role in the conceptual structure of his theory. The first point in
his theory is gaining knowledge about the realm of appearances of things or
their phenomenological level. He is influenced by Kant in this view point.
The other point is the presumption of the concept of time as a primary and
fundamental concept which is a prerequisite of experience in Kant’s view as
well. Kant assumed time and space as two a priori features of experience,
while they are not in themselves perceivable in experience. Indeed, time and
space are two subjective concepts and every physical object corresponds to
these subjective intuitions by the process of gaining knowledge about natural
phenomena, where mind has a primary role here. Yet, we expect that each
subject does conform to a real independently existed object. On the other
hand, Kant believed that mind recognizes the thing not in itself, but through
its appearances, thus, through perception [3].
In the same way, von Weizsa¨cker thinks that our knowledge of physics is
possible based on the realm of appearances of physical entities (observables)
and by means of perception. We construct our knowledge about an object
using descriptions about their observables. Thus, necessarily we presume the
existence of an object with all of its observables to construct knowledge about
it. The object is matter and at the same time it has a form. However, von
Weizsa¨cker goes a step further respecting Kant who is leaving aside space and
excluding time as a precondition of experience. For, von Weizsa¨cker states
that space is derivable from ur-theory and it is not a necessary precondition
of experience.
According to von Weizsa¨cker, experience means learning from the past for
the sake of future. The past, present and future tenses are thus prerequisites
for experience [2, p.3]. Thus, experience is a temporal concept. Similar
to Kant who introduced intuition and subjective prerequisites for empirical
knowledge, which are known as Kant’s twelve categories, von Weizsa¨cker
assumes time order as a necessary condition for empirical knowledge.
As mentioned earlier in Kant’s view, the object conforms to subject by
gaining knowledge about natural phenomena, instead of that the subject con-
forms to the real independently existed objects. von Weizsa¨cker is apparently
influenced by this viewpoint in constructing his ur-theory.
When one talks about an event in the past, thenceforth, (s)he considers
it as a factual event. However, events pertaining to future have not actually
occurred yet and are accounted as potentialities. In this regard, probability
by its very nature is a temporal concept. This seems to mean that, one can
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ascribe a probabilistic statement only for events pertaining to the future,
while, we cannot talk about factually past occurred events with probabilistic
propositions. Therefore, the concept of probability is intertwined with the
concept of upcoming experiences. Hence, the concepts of time and prob-
ability are considered as prerequisites of empirical natural science 1. Re-
garding the importance of temporal experience in Weizsacker’s view and the
distinction between past and future in temporal events, one should notice
that, however, the meaning of “factually past occurred events” is completely
vague in quantum mechanics. For example, let us assume that at t = t0, we
measure the spin component of a spin-1
2
particle alonge z-direction, Sz, and
obtain +~
2
. Then, we perform a similar measurement along x-direction, Sx,
at t = t1 > t0. What can we say about Sz at t1? It is a past occurred event
with value +~
2
, but it is not factual in any sense at t1. Any fact is a fact
in quantum events, when we know it with certainty. Otherwise, it is an in-
determinate phenomenon. So, our experience is limited to perceived facts at
present, and past events are only important for making predictions about the
future status of the system. At present, nothing can be said about the actual
values obtained before for the system. Hence, our experiences at different
times do not form a shared experience as a whole. For classical objects, also,
there are situations in which one cannot talk about a past occurred event
with certainty, because it might be measured with low precision. Past events,
even if considered factual could be probabilistic.
The aforementioned lattice of propositions is established about properties
which could be known by experience or by the realm of appearances of a given
object. This is the basis for one of the main postulates of von Weizsa¨cker in
establishing ur-theory, i.e., the existence of separable alternatives to which
the next section is devoted.
3 Ur-theory
Ur-theory was a result of von Weizsa¨cker’s efforts towards establishing a uni-
fied theory of physics. Because physics is the most fundamental of all natural
sciences including chemistry and Biology, such a theory should be capable
of describing these domains of science as well. In his viewpoint, quantum
theory among all theories of physics is the most fundamental and compre-
hensive one which could be the base for such a unified physical theory. The
probabilistic nature of predictions of quantum theory, also, makes it general.
One could assume quantum theory as a general theory of probability for its
1We will not use the adjective ”empirical” before ”science” throughout our work in this
paper, for in von Weizsa¨cker’s view natural science is generally empirical
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statistical predictions and von Neumann’s abstract mathematical description
of the theory can be viewed as a mathematical basis for a fundamental theory
of physics [2, p.9].
von Weizsa¨cker considers quantum theory as possessing two levels. One
is an abstract level which is limited to the mathematical framework of von
Neumann, in which everything is described in Hilbert space without con-
sidering actual and classical concepts like position space, potentials, fields
and particles. These concepts are pertaining to the second level, which von
Weizsa¨cker calls the concrete level of the quantum theory. Then, he recon-
structs an abstract representation of quantum theory using some postulates
to establish his ur-theory [2, 4-9].
We previously said that in von Weizsa¨cker’s view, quantum theory is a
general theory of probability. This theory helps us to analyze everything
in terms of binary alternatives with yes/no answers which mean that there
exist empirically decidable alternatives. This is the first and most signifi-
cant postulate of ur-theory. These alternatives could be either possibilities
of the occurrence of an event or propositions with which one describes a phe-
nomenon which could be empirically tested. Indeed, what von Weizsa¨cker
actually does is reducing physical observables to logical concepts of alter-
natives. When we want to gain empirical knowledge about something, we
assume a number of logical alternatives about that object or event. Any re-
peatable experimental result is one of these alternatives. In this case, we say
that observable properties are reduced to logical alternatives. However, this
is possible only if one presupposes the existence of the object. This postulate
is applicable in classical mechanics as well. One could divide every concept
to smaller and smaller descriptive elements by means of binary alternatives
until reaching the smallest indivisible part which is called by von Weizsa¨cker
“ur”. Actually, this postulate follows the classical logic in which such an
analysis is applicable for every perceivable property of an object. The only
difference between classical and quantum mechanical logic in this regard is
the selection of the corresponding lattice of propositions which is related to
the definition and significance of information in each domain. One could
deduce that for indivisible phenomena, two inseparable systems should be
considered as a united whole. In other words, in these cases we are dealing
with a non-classical phenomenon with a quantum mechanical nature. Here
the word “phenomenon” is brought from Bohr as a result of his efforts for re-
solving the measurement problem and the effect of the measurement device
on observed results. Bohr thought that the system and the measurement
setup should be treated as one inseparable whole, known as phenomenon,
considering that the underlying nature of interaction between the measur-
ing setup and the system is in principle unknowable. Following this line
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of thought, the lattice of propositions in classical mechanics is established
about separable objects and in quantum mechanics, it is established about
phenomena. Thus, the only difference between classical and quantum me-
chanical probabilities as mentioned earlier is in the selection of the lattice of
propositions.
Therefore, the lattice of propositions is not exclusively applicable to sep-
arable events, but also to inseparable events. For instance, the entanglement
between spatially separated quantum particles, results in a correlation be-
tween them in such a way that the information of one particle becomes de-
pendent on the information of the other particle. This leads to an excess of
information in quantum mechanics, relative to classical mechanics, because
entanglement provides exact knowledge of one of the systems without any
measurement performed on the other system. Similarly, one can mention
the quantum uncertainty relation in which one cannot obtain sharp distri-
butions for two incompatible observables in a simultaneous measurement.
This means that complete and exact information about both incompatible
observables is not accessible, simultaneously. In the plan of reconstruction of
quantum theory, these points should be taken seriously. Taking these points
into consideration, von Weizsa¨cker introduces his second postulate, namely
the postulate of indeterminacy or postulate of expansion [2, p.77]:
To any two mutually exclusive final propositions a1 and a2 about
an object, there is a final proposition about the same object which
does not exclude either of the two. Two propositions x and y
exclude one another if p(x, y) = p(y, x) = 0.
The quantum theoretical excess information is a result of this postulate.
This is one of the necessary requirements of any theory of probability, as
he denotes. In an expansion, no term possesses an absolute true value and
as we mentioned earlier, probability is assumed as a temporal concept here,
meaning that one can use probabilistic statements only for future events.
Thus, in his opinion, time is the only concept amongst all of classical con-
cepts that has a significant and fundamental role in the reconstruction of
abstract quantum mechanics and is assumed by von Weizsacker as a realistic
variable instead of being a parameter. In this regard, inspired from classical
fundamental concept of time, he introduces the third postulate namely the
postulate of “dynamics”. However, contrary to classical mechanics in the
development of ur-theory, there are real distinctions between future and past
modalities of time. This distinction reveals itself in the irreversibility of the
measurement process and in the reduction of the wave function. Moreover,
von Weizsacker tries to prove the Second Law of Thermodynamics using
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Boltzmann’s H-theorem and through his definition of time. He believes that
time also reveals itself as a real physical entity in Thermodynamics. We leave
this point for further consideration in future.
As is apparent, two abstract prerequisites for experience are identifiable
in von Weizsa¨cker’s view. The first one is the concept of time that is de-
fined as the real distinction between the past and the potential future. The
second one is the existence of decidable alternatives. Each alternative can
be analyzed and divided into binary alternatives called “ur”s. This decid-
ability is based on experience. One could plan experiments in which one
should choose an answer between two opposite results, i.e., yes and no. Step
by step, this analysis reaches an ultimate proposition with yes/no decisions.
This final irreducible alternative is called “ur”. Based on these premises,
von Weizsa¨cker establishes a lattice of logical binary propositions about ev-
ery observable property. This lattice has 2k dimensions in Hilbert space.
If one uses classical information, i.e., Shannon information, this space pos-
sesses k bits of information. Yet, according to the expansion postulate, in
quantum mechanics one could expand the given state space in terms of basis
states defined for incompatible observables. Consequently, one can assign
an unlimited number of bits of information to this 2k dimensional lattice of
propositions. The ultimate binary alternative “ur” is the smallest part of the
lattice and the smallest element of physical information as well which pos-
sesses spinor characteristics, meaning that it has a two dimensional Hilbert
space and could be assumed as an atom of information with a substantial
role in the structure of physics. Indeed, every physical property which is
empirically knowable to us could be reduced to these atoms of information.
Definitely, von Weizsa¨cker asserts that one can construct all objective and
(non-abstract) concepts of quantum mechanics based on the concept of in-
formation and ur-theory. For instance, the three-dimensional position space
could be reduced to the concept of “ur” and its spinor space, accordingly.
The reasoning for this assertion is that the proper symmetry group of urs
is spinor’s symmetry group of SU(2). Taking advantage of the isomorphism
of this symmetry group with the symmetry group of rotation in three di-
mensional space (i.e., SO(3)), von Weizsacker deduced the three dimensional
position space from two dimensional Hilbert space of “ur”s. Moreover, he
was aiming to deduce all other quantum mechanical concepts like field and
particle using the substantial concept of atoms of information [10-12].
7
4 The role of information in Thermodynam-
ics and Biological evolution
Evolution in this survey refers to the emergence of new forms in Biological
systems during the history of earth. If entropy is a quantitative measure of
irreversibility, information is the quantitative measure of evolution as well.
Information refers to the amount of form, in other words the amount of
Gestalt. Since Biological evolution is associated with increasing of variety
of forms, the amount of information increases in this process. The amount
of form is a property of an object and is defined by von Weizsa¨cker as the
following [2, p.214]:
The more decisions can be made about an object, the more form
one can recognize in it, in a general not necessarily spatial mean-
ing of the word.
In other words, the amount of form is equivalent to the number of the
possibilities for different descriptions of a given object. For example, a DNA
molecule is described by various possibilities for the arrangement of its nu-
cleotides, a spin-1
2
particle is described by two possibilities for its spin compo-
nents and N number of harmonic oscillators are described by 2N possibilities
for their parity1, etc.
On the other hand, Thermodynamic entropy is equivalent to the poten-
tial information. Therefore, information is a fundamental concept in both
domains of Thermodynamics and Biology.
Because of the mentioned common characteristic of irreversibility in Ther-
modynamics and Biological evolution, these two domains of nature are as-
sumed as one phenomenon occurring in two different levels. Here, however,
one encounters the controversial problem of whether the Biological evolution
occurs in accordance with the Second Law of Thermodynamics. However,
von Weizsa¨cker’s answer is yes, Biological evolution doesn’t violate the Sec-
ond Law of Thermodynamics. He believes that the mentioned problem arises
from the fact that in text books of Thermodynamics, the increase of entropy
is described as an increase of disorder. On the other hand, Biological evolu-
tion is associated with increasing of order. Accordingly, these two domains
seem to be in contrast with each other. Nevertheless, one may consider order
1Parity (Π̂) is a unitary operator in quantum mechanics with two eigenvalues +1 and
−1, defining in turn, even and odd parities for an arbitrary state-vector |ψ
i
〉. In a math-
ematical description, Π̂ |ψ
i
〉 = ±1 |ψ
i
〉. As is obvious parity refers to the symmetry of the
wave function under space coordinate inversion.
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or disorder as esthetical concepts, but not physical ones. To consider biolog-
ical systems, one should have into account non-equilibrium thermodynamics
in which the rate of dissipation of energy and time rate of entropy production
is crucial.
Regardless of this point, von Weizsa¨cker believes that [2, p.215]:
It is usual to interpret entropy as a measure of disorder, and
thereby thermodynamic irreversibility as an increase in disor-
der. Evolution, however, is understood as an increase in possible
forms, and in that sense as order. Under these premises evolu-
tion must be perceived as a process proceeding against thermo-
dynamic irreversibility. Here, exactly the opposite thesis is to be
presented: Under suitable circumstances, an increase in entropy
is identical to the growth of forms; evolution is a special case of
the irreversibility of events.”
Let us first see how von Weizsa¨cker defines information in these domains.
Information has not an absolute definition. As he says: An “absolute” con-
cept of information has no meaning; information exists only “under one con-
cept,” more accurately, “relative on two semantic levels”[2, p.217]. We need
at least two semantic levels for which information could be defined relatively.
For instance, in Statistical Thermodynamics, information is quantified rela-
tive to macro-state and micro-state levels. The amount of information of a
macro-state is related to the number of micro-states it contains. Therefore,
we cannot talk about information of a macro-state without considering its
corresponding micro-states. Determination of the micro and macro-states
depends on the physical system (or the object) under study. For instance,
DNA chain constitutes the macro-state and different arrangements of its
nucleotides make its micro-states. Assuming that entropy is equivalent to in-
formation, von Weizsa¨cker explicitly states that entropy is a measure of form.
The more information is there about an object, the greater is the number
of forms (possible descriptions) of that object. Based on this argument, von
Weizsa¨cker claims that assigning the increase of entropy to the increase of
disorder is a linguistic mistake. As he believes [2, p.222]:
The concept of entropy is so general and abstract that the speci-
fication of a high a priori probability for a state rich in form also
amounts to assigning a high entropy to it.
Therefore, the concept of information in Thermodynamics and Biology is
somehow similar.
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However, one may question what is the difference between that informa-
tion which is the measure of irreversibility and that which is the measure
of evolution? Their only difference is in the selection of the micro-state and
macro-state levels. Additionally, there is a correspondence between entropy
and the amount of Gestalt. So, any modeling of Thermodynamic irreversibil-
ity according to The Second Law regarding the increase of disorder is a lin-
guistic mistake and should be revised.
In Thermodynamics, one only needs two corresponding levels of micro-
state-macro-state to gain information from a system. But, in Biology, von
Weizsa¨cker adds another level to the Thermodynamic semantic levels, called
the morphological level. One measures the information of a macro-state with
respect to the micro-states and entropy or information increases with the in-
crease of the number of micro-states. In a similar way, in Biology information
of a morphological state is evaluated with respect to its lower levels of macro
and micro-states. Thus, von Weizsa¨cker concludes that the both above pro-
cesses, i.e., Thermodynamic irreversibility and Biological evolution include
the concept of information as a central notion, so that both of them are
substantially related to information. Thus, they are identical in nature, but
occur in different levels of natural processes.
von Weizsa¨cker proves this claim using two lines of verification. The first
is a model that we analyze first. According to this model, if the first level
(i.e., the micro-state) is illustrated as the atomic level and the second level or
the macro-state is modeled by the molecular level, then the level of variety of
forms in Biology – which includes a spectrum of Biological macro-molecules
to a diversity of living systems is pertaining to the third level called the
morphological level. In Thermodynamics, the quantification of information
associated with a process needs only the first two semantic levels. While,
in Biological evolution one needs the third level in addition to the first and
second levels. For example, the bases in a DNA molecule make the atomic
level, then the molecular level is the arrangement of bases in a part of the
DNA molecule making, e.g., the gene which determines the color of eyes in
a human body which constitutes the morphological level.
The clearest explanation is better to be quoted directly from von Weiz-
sacker’s book [2, p.222]:
Restricting attention, as in the previous examples, to two seman-
tic levels and one thereby defined concept of information, there
follows from the structure of time only the Second Law: as time
progresses, the actual information of the state present at that
time will decrease with overwhelming probability, its potential
information (entropy) increase. If one wants to express the de-
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velopment of form by means of the concept of information at all,
one must introduce (at least) three semantic levels, with three
different measures of information then defined among them.
Consequently, Thermodynamic irreversibility is a special case of the Bi-
ological evolution, occurring at lower levels and both processes include the
notion of information within their foundation.
The other line of verification, Weizsa¨cker talks about, is based on the
Second Law of Thermodynamics. He uses the growth of a crystal as an
illustration. This process is a good example of the increase of order in a
system. Since it is a spontaneous process, von Weizsa¨cker deduces that it
occurs with accordance to the second law and is associated with an increase
of entropy. Thus, an increase of entropy is associated with an increase of
order in the crystallization process. He finally concludes that information
increases in this process, and the same occurs in Biological evolution, i.e.,
the increase of potential forms.
In a crystallization process, there are infinite possibilities for the genera-
tion of a final form which show the variety of arrangements in both molecular
(macro-state) level and atomic (micro-state) level. By increasing these pos-
sibilities, the amount of information increases as well. This is analogous to
what occurs in Biological evolution.
However, neither of the above arguments is flawless. First, he models the
three levels of micro-state, macro-state and the level of variety of forms by
atomic, molecular and morphological levels, respectively. Indeed he models
the levels of energy distribution of particles which have a crucial role in
Statistical Thermodynamics, with the variety of molecular forms produced
by combination of atoms. It seems that the Thermodynamic level could be
described by characterizing the particle’s level and its underlying classical
laws. At the same time, atoms with appropriate energies combine with each
other to form molecules which are the more organized forms relative to the
atomic level. The Thermodynamic level including the assembly of atoms (or
the molecular level) is assumed to be a more organized level than the atomic
level in von Weizsa¨cker’s view. A higher level of organization occurs at
the Biological level. While, the formation of molecules from atoms could be
understood in terms of atomic levels of energy and the formation of molecular
orbitals according to quantum mechanics, Thermodynamic process is not
reducible to the dynamical-mechanical description. It seems that he wants to
build a connection between micro-states (described by quantum mechanics)
with the atomic level (which models the micro-states) on one hand, and
the macro-state (described by Thermodynamics) with the molecular level
(which models the macro-state) on the other hand in such a way that one
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could reduce the Thermodynamic level to the dynamical-mechanical level.
One could in principle establish molecular structures based on dynamical-
mechanical rules. Yet, the Thermodynamics level is not reducible to these
rules even in principle. Since, e.g., entropy is not a dynamical-mechanical
notion. With a closer look, for gaining information about a macro-state one
needs to consider the number of micro-states. So, the variety and multiplicity
are characteristic features of the micro-level. For example, the mean value
of energy in Thermodynamics is a measure of temperature and is being used
to describe the macro-state. In this case, the micro-states are the individual
particle’s energy levels.
In effect, the order of levels in Biological evolution according to von
Weizsa¨cker’s model is as the following,
Atomic→ Molecular →Morphological
So, as is expected, the higher levels should be the more general levels and
the lower levels should possess more variety and multiplicity. Every higher
level should be considered as a macro-state with respect to its lower level.
Therefore, the morphological level should be considered as a macro-state with
respect to the molecular level, in the same way that the molecular level is a
macro-state with respect to the atomic level (micro-state) and the amount
of information in each case is evaluated with respect to attributes of these
levels.
Yet, one should notice that the multiplicity of forms in Biological evolu-
tion appears at the morphological level. Then, the direction of the relation
between these semantic levels changes. Because, the macro-state in Biology
(corresponding to the morphological level) has more variety and multiplicity
than its corresponding molecular level. This relationship is somehow sim-
ilar to the relationship between the atomic and molecular levels. For, at
the atomic level, the multiplicity of states (or, correspondingly, the abstract
forms of knowledge) is again considerable. This is important, when the no-
tion of information is taken into account. So, the true direction of levels
changes to the following form:
Atomic→ Molecular ←Morphological
The molecular level seems to have the less diversity with respect to both
atomic and morphological levels. Consequently, to define information, the
hierarchy of levels with respect to each other is not identical in irreversible
processes and Biological evolution. Hence, the model doesn’t fulfill the real
situation.
The second line of reasoning for unifying entropy and evolution is also
not acceptable. Although, it is true that the process of formation of a crystal
occurs in accordance with the Second Law of Thermodynamics, it is actually
associated with an entropy decrease for the system and not increase as von
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Weizsa¨cker assumes. Nevertheless, the decrease of entropy in this process
is dominated by decreasing enthalpy and the crystallization occurs sponta-
neously.
Had we assumed that von Weizsa¨cker considered the whole entropy of the
universe, this reasoning could still not be true [2, p.221]. Since, in the latter
case, one cannot refer to the properties of the system and its states directly,
as is usually requested for evaluating information.
5 A critical analysis of ur-theory
The work of von Weizsa¨cker in the difficult area of philosophy of science is an
appreciable work, for it was a great challenge in unifying physics. It attracted
much attention and resulted in branches of insights on the understanding of
the concept of information in natural sciences up to the present time.
We saw through the three previous sections that von Weizsa¨cker consid-
ers information as a fundamental concept which is the basis for everything
in physics. The physical object could be constructed from atoms of informa-
tion. Furthermore, in the same line of reasoning the position space, forces
and every physical observable could be reduced to an information basis. In
addition, we saw that in Thermodynamics and Biological evolution, informa-
tion identifies the amount of potential forms (and possibilities). The more
the required number of propositions for describing an object, the more is its
information and consequently, the more is its amount of Gestalt (form).
One may ask, however, what von Weizsa¨cker means by “form”? Following
Aristotelian philosophy, he considers form as the essence of everything. Yet,
form is a property of the object and knowable to us. This property is not
separable from the object. Form, like any other property, should be analyzed
by informational propositions with yes/no answers. The more propositions
are required to describe an object, the more are its possible forms. Thus,
form is the substance and information is the measure of substance. The
ultimate alternative is called “ur” that is an atom of information. Here, the
classical atomism is replaced by an abstract logical atomism. In the classical
atomism, the division of an object to smaller parts takes place in the position
space. Divisibility in terms of logical “ur”s is assumed by von Weizsa¨cker as
a radical atomism which is an atomism based on the concept of information.
But, what is information? In addition to being a measure of form, infor-
mation is what is understood [2, p.304]. This kind of definition mixes the
subjective and objective notions of information all together. For example,
the arrangement of nucleotides in the DNA molecular structure includes ob-
jective information about the future behavior of a living being independent
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of whether it could be observed or not. “Understanding” in this case is the
development of genotype to phenotype according to von Weizsa¨cker. This
means that when a given form of a living being is changed in an evolution
period to cause a transition from genotype to phenotype, a kind of under-
standing is also developed during this transition. This “understanding” is
an attribute of the organism, itself, not dependent on perception of another
conscious being.
This phenotype is an objectified semantic. On the other hand, we need at
least two semantic levels of macro-state and micro-state to evaluate informa-
tion. Thus, information has not an absolute definition, here. The alternatives
or potentialities are not absolute but are defined relative to special semantic
levels. The same situation holds for information. The definition of proposi-
tions or “ur”s is constrained by the restrictions of measurement instruments
and limitations of human knowledge. Information in von Weizsa¨cker’s view
is neither matter nor energy. But, it is another entity independent from both
of them.
Semantic levels of information encounter us with concepts of mind and
matter in von Weizsa¨cker’s philosophy, for which there is no fundamental
duality in this view. Mind should be understood as a natural entity like
matter, and human knowledge is a process occurring in Nature and belong-
ing to it. So, knowledge is not independent of the matter stuff of the world.
Information is both objective and subjective at the same time. The informa-
tion about an object is objectively there, whether we know about it or not.
However, it is knowable to us.
An object has a remarkable ontological aspect. Its observables are ac-
cidental or extrinsic properties and have no independent existence. Their
existence depends on object’s existence. They are knowable to us and we
analyze them by logical propositions. This logical aspect of knowledge which
is based on perception, ultimately leads to a “ur”, i.e., the ultimate alterna-
tive of information. “Ur” is a logical concept and yet is not independently
definable without assuming an object and its observables. Considering what
von Weizsa¨cker says about the dependence of the decision of the lattice of
propositions or the definition of “ur”s on the limitations of measurement
instruments, “ur” is relatively an accidental concept.
It is admissible to ask how such a concept could be considered fundamen-
tal and substantial. Unfortunately, the definitions of an object and the atom
of information called “ur” make a loop.One might consider the object and
the atom of information as a whole, just like the system and the measuring
instrument in quantum mechanics. Yet, there could be no “ur” when there
is no object. Any proposition about an object dependes per se on the nature
of the object being considered. Then, its nature refers to proposition being
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used. First, an object is presumed, then, its observable properties are de-
fined through which one could gain knowledge about the object. Therefore,
one analyzes these observables by binary alternatives which could be ques-
tions with equi-probable yes/no answers until reaching a final proposition.
However, the final proposition (or a “ur”) depends on our previous decisions
of propositions and is not distinguishable from them by itself. For example
a proposition might be about up and down spin components of a quantum
particle or about its massiveness. Such a proposition depends on the nature
of the object being considered. So, information about an object is object-
dependent. In another words, it is claimed that a “ur” is substantial. Yet,
the nature of an object should be presumed, because without the definition
of an object and characterizing its properties, the definition of a network of
propositions which could ultimately lead to an atom of information “ur” is
impossible. So, an irreducible element of subjectivism (i.e., the role of our
minds in knowing and characterizing the matter stuff of the world including
all objects and their properties) is introduced.
Regarding Kant’s view, the scientific knowledge refers to properties of
physical objects as conceptualized by us. Our conceptions and our mental
frameworks influence our scientific knowledge. For instance, we naturally
have a Euclidean imagery of space. Our minds bear space and time as pre-
requisites of experience and our apprehension occur within this mental frame-
work. This could be generalized to any logical method of gaining knowledge.
However, limiting natural sciences to human subjectivism is a limitation to
the creative and innovative apprehension of physical phenomena.
For example, one can notice that imaging a non-Euclidean geometry for
space in Relativity Theory of Einstein could not be understood in terms
of mental presupposition of special structures of space-time. So, Relativity
Theory is a good example for how mind conforms to the external reality
and that how physics does not match our mental framework. However, von
Weizsa¨cker, trying to avoid the loop of subjective-objective information, de-
clares that the process of cognition and gaining empirical knowledge is a
process belonging to Nature itself. In his view form is the essence of every
object and it is also the essence of mind. Nevertheless, if we accept this
argument we expect that a physical explanation for the unity of mind and
matter in terms of “ur”s could be possible. No such underlying physics has
been given yet. Furthermore, ur-theory does not explain how matter origi-
nates from the abstract logical concept of “ur”. From a different view, in von
Weizsa¨cker’s opinion, experience is the cornerstone of physics. Experience is
defined by him as the usage of data obtained from observation and measure-
ments occurred in past for doing predictions about the future. Or as he says,
experience means learning from the past for the sake of the future. However,
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in some situations, we cannot know all properties of an object by experience
(or through observation). In such instances how can one establish a lattice
of propositions reducible to a final proposition or a “ur”? For example, con-
sider the known problem of wave-particle duality in quantum mechanics. The
quantum object has a particle-like behavior in some experimental conditions
and behaves as a wave in other situations. Our experimental setups deter-
mine what we could observe for the object. Then our decisions influence the
final “ur” proposition which can tell the object is a particle or wave. Each
of these entities in turn has a completely different lattice of propositions.
The proposition about the identity of being wave or particle in the logical
reduction approach toward a “ur”, is unavoidably dependent upon our ex-
perimental conditions. So, according to ur-theory wave or particle should be
assumed as a property of the whole experimental setup of a quantum object
and not its nature by itself. But, what does ur-theory tell about an individ-
ual quantum object or its own nature? How can “ur” which is expected to
be a fundamental and substantial entity depend on the external and empiri-
cal conditions of observation at the same time? The atom of information is
context-dependent, just like the physical behavior of the object, itself. So,
what is the fundamental preference of a “ur”? This leads to the conclusion
that an atom of information has a dual character in its essence, correspond-
ing to the dual character of a quantum object in different situations. Then,
what is more fundamental, an object or its information? In this way, we will
never know what a quantum object is and what its physical nature implies.
The problem remains a problem and our knowledge of physics transforms
to the knowledge of description of observations as it happened in the early
quantum theory. Replacing objective atoms with “ur”s does not solve any
problem to help us obtaining a clearer picture of Nature and the behavior of
its parts.
On the other hands, as is apparent from ur-theory, atoms of information
are quantitative measures of a given object. It is evident that measures of
the properties of a physical object could not be the essence of that object,
especially if these measures only evaluate the extrinsic properties. This makes
science be limited to merely perceptible levels of phenomena.
von Weizsa¨cker’s view which confines natural science to human percep-
tion and the realm of appearances of physical things (observable properties)
is problematic. As Kant implies, the impossibility of substantive and priory
knowledge independent of experience leads to the conclusion that the ob-
ject must conform to the subject to make knowledge possible. Influenced by
this view, von Weizsa¨cker introduces knowledge about an object by classify-
ing observations in a logical subjective framework of mind and constructs a
lattice of propositions or atoms of information. One should note that, how-
16
ever, there are theories in physics that have predictions proved empirically
after they are predicted by the theory itself. For example, the existence of
positrons was theoretically predicted by Dirac in quantum field theory. It
was four years after this prediction that the particle was detected empiri-
cally by Carl Anderson. These kinds of theoretical predictions affirm that
making correspondence between the predictions of theory with experience is
not the mere way of gaining knowledge. Yet, in ur-theory, von Weizsa¨cker
concentrates on the role of experience. The lattice of propositions about an
object is constructed using the data obtained from experiments or former
observations.
This way that confines our knowledge to perception and empirical incomes
cannot resolve explanatory problems of quantum phenomena. In order to ex-
plain quantum weirdnesses (like wave-particle duality, nonlocal correlations,
etc.) which are unexplainable by classical theories, using perception is not
sufficient at all. Leaving aside material atomism and replacing it with infor-
mational atomism which is not more than a measure for manifesting forms of
an object resolves no paradoxes. Moreover, it leads to new vague problems
like: How could material objects be constructed from atoms of information?
Or how could one explain subject-object association in natural events by an
information-based view?
For information to be so fundamental and objective as von Weizsacker
aimed to set it, we need a more abstract definition of this concept. Informa-
tion needs to arise not from human logical roots. It should be independent
of semantics and free of transmission aspects of communication. A step to-
ward such concept was taken by Gornitz through introducing the objective
concept of protyposis [13]:
Physics is more than an “extension of logics”, and, in physics
information differs from destination, or meaning, or knowledge.
Meaning always has a subjective aspect too, so meaning cannot
be a basis for science and objectivity. If quantum information
is to become the basis for science it must be conceived as abso-
lute quantum information, free of meaning. It is denominated as
“Protyposis” to avoid the connotation of information and mean-
ing. Protyposis enables a fundamentally new understanding of
matter which can be seen as “formed”, “condensed” or “designed”
abstract quantum information.
This concept is believed to be a basis for derivation of Einsteinian struc-
ture of the non-Euclidian space-time [14].
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Gornitz also offers an answer to our previously asked question by the
concept of protyposis that “how could material objects be constructed from
atoms of information?”[15]:
If the protyposis should be connected with the established parts
of physics, then, beside other requirements, the construction of
relativistic particles from qubits has to be given. This means
that irreducible representations of the Poincare-group must be
constructed.
However, it is not clear how different aspects of reality, like material ob-
jects, energy, space-time, etc., could be obtained based on a unique and ab-
stract concept of protyposis. How do these variety of concepts arise from such
an abstract concept, without reference to any distinguishing agent necessary
for making these distinctions meaningful? Could it predict new concepts or
is it just a descriptive concept which provides a different language by which
everything could be reduced to protyposis?
One of the other main problems of ur-theory is that when a lattice of
propositions is constructed for an object, it should include all properties of
that object. This means that all possible propositions that could be used for
describing an object should be included in the logical lattice of propositions,
so that the greater is the number of propositions, the greater is the number of
forms that object possesses. Considering continuous variables, like x and p,
however, there is no complete set of propositions for describing the quantum
state. This means that there are possibilities which could not be reduced
to a final proposition in principle. So, a final proposition is not possible
for an object and we are faced with an infinite number of elements of a
lattice of information. Then, one cannot extract an object from informational
basis. Yet, in von Weizsa¨cker’s view, the existence of a final proposition is a
necessary condition for an object to actually exist[2, p.77]:
If a certain object actually exists, then a final proposition about
it is always necessary.
As von Weizsa¨cker claims, this statement is equivalent to saying that [2,
p.77]:
Every object has at any time as property a probability distribu-
tion of all its properties.
However, the problem is that the existence of a lattice of propositions
is not always associated with the existence of a final proposition. In cases
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which a final proposition does not exist for a system, von Weizsa¨cker says
that such an object does not actually exist at all. This is in contradiction
with situations described by continuous variables.
And at last, let’s see the role of information in Biology again. Biological
evolution is associated with the increase of variety of forms and Biodiversity.
If one asks why evolution takes place in this way, the answer is usually that
this process occurs, because it is the more probable process. This answer is
the same as the answer to the question of why Thermodynamic irreversibility
occurs as the more probable process of increasing entropy. In static states,
we can say the form of Biological systems could be described using a lattice
of binary propositions. The final proposition is a “ur” with two equally likely
answers. This shows that this lattice is basically symmetric. But a dynamic
process like evolution –which occurs, because it is more likely to occur- could
not be explained using the fully symmetric theory of information. In com-
pletely symmetric states, information reaches its maximum value and could
not further increase. Therefore, diversity of forms does not occur as well.
One may logically analyze a static system to reach a final proposition, but
application of ur-theory to dynamic changes like evolution is paradoxical. Re-
garding information theory as a time-independent representation, ur-theory
makes no distinction between states before and after evolution. Ur-theory
is symmetric in the selection among several possibilities. It does not ex-
plain how such a selection among states which the system evolves toward
them occurs. On the other hands, even if we accept that applying ur-theory
to the dynamics of a quantum system has no problem, we have no unique
mathematical model for the dynamics for a system under evolution which
is different with a mechanical system. So, one have no answer according to
ur-theory for biological evolution.
On the other hands, we know that there are cases in Nature for which such
a symmetry is broken. For example two chiral molecules have a completely
similar lattice of logical alternatives. But each final proposition is the oppo-
site alternative of the other one. Yet, in nature, one of these cases uniquely
occurs. For example, all amino acids which constitute natural proteins are
right-handed and all tao neutrinos are left-handed. Almost all spiral oysters
are right-handed. This break of symmetry is not understandable here, be-
cause left-handed and right-handed answers are equally probable according
to ur-theory.
For continuous variables, however, no complete set of propositions exist.
For instance, with a discrete variable like spin, we have in every direction a
complete set of propositions given by up and down alternatives. For contin-
uous variables like x and p, the number of alternatives are not finite.
This is somehow similar to saying that for a continuous variable we have
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analog information, while, for a discrete variable, every proposition contains
a digital information. Analog information is innumerable and infinite, so it
prevents us from constructing a lattice of propositions with definite limits
[16].
6 Conclusions
Our analysis of ur-theory shows that replacing material atomism by logi-
cal informational atomism leaves quantum paradoxes unresolved, and yet is
not successful in unifying Biology, Thermodynamics and Quantum Theory.
Furthermore, it leads to additional obscurities like how logical elements of
information could build material objects in a physical sense. “Ur”s as atoms
of information are dependent on human decisions and confined to instrumen-
tal limitations and could not be assumed substantial, as ur-theory implies.
Another problem is about applying ur-theory to Biology, especially in resolv-
ing the problem of homo-chirality which bears a kind of symmetry breaking
in nature. Even if we consider there is another universe which has opposite
symmetries to ours, this doesn’t explain why this kind of symmetry breaking
or chairlity exists in our universe.
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